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Abstract—Despite the increasing popularity and successful examples of crowdsourcing, it is stripped of aureole when collective
efforts are derailed or severely hindered by elaborate sabotage. A service exchange dilemma arises when non-cooperation among self-
interested users, and zero social welfare is obtained at myopic equilibrium. Traditional rating protocols are not effective to overcome
the inefficiency of the socially undesirable equilibrium due to specific features of crowdsourcing: a large number of anonymous users
having asymmetric service requirements, different service capabilities, and dynamically joining/leaving a crowdsourcing platform
with imperfect monitoring. In this paper, we develop the first game-theoretic design of the two-sided rating protocol to stimulate
cooperation among self-interested users, which consists of a recommended strategy and a rating update rule. The recommended
strategy recommends a desirable behavior from three predefined plans according to intrinsic parameters, while the rating update
rule involves the update of ratings of both users, and uses differential punishments that punish users with different ratings differently.
By quantifying necessary and sufficient conditions for a sustainable social norm, we formulate the problem of designing an optimal
two-sided rating protocol that maximizes the social welfare among all sustainable protocols, provide design guidelines for optimal
two-sided rating protocols and a low-complexity algorithm to select optimal design parameters in an alternate manner. Finally,
evaluation results show the validity and effectiveness of our protocol designed for service exchange dilemma in crowdsourcing.
Index Terms—service exchange, incentive mechanism, rating protocol, differential punishment, sustainable social norm, game
theory
I. INTRODUCTION
CROWDSOURCING has emerged in recent years as aparadigm for leveraging human intelligence and activity
at a large scale, it offers a distributed and cost-effective
approach to obtain needed content, information or services
by soliciting contributions from an undefined set of people,
instead of assigning a job to designated employees [1], [2].
Over the past decade, numerous successful crowdsourcing
platforms, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) [3],
Yahoo! Answers [4], Upwork [5] emerge. With the help of
crowdsourcing platforms and with the power of a crowd,
crowdsourcing is becoming increasingly popular as it provides
an efficient and cheap method of obtaining solutions to com-
plex tasks that are currently beyond computational capabilities
but possible for humans [6], [7], [8].
Over the past decade, techniques for securing crowdsourc-
ing operations have been expanding steadily, so has the
number of applications of crowdsourcing [9]. However, users
in a crowdsourcing platform have the opportunity to exhibit
antisocial behaviors due to the openness of crowdsourcing, and
hence crowdsourcing is stripped of aureole when collective
efforts are derailed or severely hindered by elaborate sabo-
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tage [10], [11]. As part of crowdsourcing, service exchange
applications have proliferated as the medium that allows users
to exchange valuable services. In a typical service exchange
application, a user plays a dual role: as a client who submits
his requirement to a crowdsourcing platform, and as a server
who chooses to devote a high/low level of efforts to work on a
job and provides solutions to the client in exchange for rewards
[12]. Since providing services incurs costs to servers in terms
of power, time, bandwidth, privacy leakage, etc., rational and
self-interested users would be more inclined to devote low
level efforts when being a server, and seek for services from
others as a client, rather than providing services as a server.
Under such circumstances, non-cooperative behaviors among
self-interested users decrease their social welfare, which is a
social dilemma. Therefore, an increased level of cooperation
is considered to be socially desirable for service exchange in
crowdsourcing platforms.
The main reason why users in the above service exchange
game have the incentive not to cooperate with each other
is the absence of punishments for such malicious behaviors.
Self-interested users always adjust their strategies over time
to maximize their own utilities, however, they cannot receive
a direct and immediate benefit by choosing to be a server and
devoting a high-level effort to provide high-quality services to
other users (as clients). Such a conflict leads to an inevitable
fact that, many users would be apt to be a client to request
services, or be apt to be a server but devote a low-level effort to
provide low-quality services. Thus, an important functionality
of the crowdsourcing platform is to provide a good incentive
mechanism for service exchange. And there is an urgent
need to stimulate cooperation among self-interested users
in crowdsourcing, under which self-interested users will be
compelled to follow the social norm such that the inefficiency
of the socially undesirable equilibrium will be overcome, i.e.,
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2if a user chooses to be a server in the first stage, and provides
high-quality services in the second stage, then he should be
rewarded immediately, otherwise, he should be punished [13].
Incentives are key to the success of crowdsourcing as it
heavily depends on the level of cooperation among self-
interested users. There are two types of incentives, monetary
and non-monetary. Incentive mechanisms based on monetary
incentivize individuals to provide high-quality services relying
on monetary or matching rewards in the form of micropay-
ments, which in principle can achieve the social optimum by
internalizing external effects of self-interested individuals. The
work [14] presents a game theoretic model of an all-pay con-
test in crowdsourcing, and investigates whether multiple prizes
can maximize contest revenue. Although monetary incentives,
in some sense, are the best and easiest way to motivate people
[15], several challenges prevent monetary incentives from
success in service exchange applications. Firstly, it is difficult
to price small services (e.g., answer, knowledge, resources
etc.) being exchanged between users as these are not real
goods [16]. Deploying auctions to set the price may reduce the
price to a certain degree, while it may cause implementation
complexity, high delay, and currency inflation [17]. Secondly,
as pointed out by [18], [19] and [20], “free-riding” may
happen when rewards are paid before providing services, a
server always has the incentive to take the reward without
devoting enough effort, whereas if rewards are paid after the
service exchange is completed, “false-reporting” may arise
since the client has an incentive to lower or refuse rewards
to servers by lying about the outcome of the task. Thirdly,
although a monetary scheme is simple to be designed, it often
requires a complex accounting infrastructure, which introduces
computation overheads and substantial communication, and
thus difficult to be implemented in reality [21], [22].
In addition to monetary incentives, some applications are
endowed with different non-monetary incentive types, such as
natural incentives, personal development, solidary incentives,
material incentives, etc. [15]. Among these non-monetary
incentives, rating protocols (as a form of solidary incentives)
originally proposed by Kandori [23] have been shown to work
effectively as incentive mechanisms to force cooperation in
crowdsourcing platforms [12], [13], [16], [24], [25]. Generally
speaking, a rating protocol labels each user by a rating label
based on his past behaviors indicating his social status in the
system. And users with different ratings are treated differently
by the other users they interact with, and the rating of a
user who complies with (resp. deviates from) the social norm
goes up (resp. down). Hence, a user with high/low rating
can be rewarded/punished by other users in a crowdsourc-
ing platform who have not had past interactions with him.
Furthermore, the use of ratings as a summary record of a
user requires significantly less amount of information being
maintained [26]. Hence, the rating protocol has a potential to
form a basis for successful incentive mechanisms for service
exchange in crowdsourcing platforms. Motivated by the above
considerations, this paper is devoted to the study of incentive
mechanisms based on rating protocol.
However, there are several major reasons that prevent exist-
ing works on the rating protocol to be directly implemented
for incentive provision for service exchange in crowdsourcing:
(i) Users have asymmetric service requirements and they can
freely and frequently change their partners they interact with in
most crowdsourcing platforms, which results in asymmetric in-
teractions among those users, and it is more difficult to model
and analyze [27], [28]; (ii) Taking into account the service
capability of users and the spatial/temporal requirements of
tasks, using the framework of anonymous random matching
games in which each user is repeatedly matched with different
partners over time for service exchange is inappropriate [12],
[16]; (iii) User population is large, users are anonymous and
not sufficiently patient, especially when those users with bad
ratings may attempt to leave and rejoin the system as new
members to avoid punishments (i.e., whitewashing) [24], [29];
(iv) In the presence of imperfect monitoring, a user’s rating
may be wrongly updated, which will impact on rating protocol
design, as well as social welfare loss [13], [25].
In this paper, we take into account the above features of
service exchange in crowdsourcing into consideration, and
propose a game-theoretic framework for designing and analyz-
ing a class of rating protocols based incentive mechanisms, in
order to stimulate cooperation among self-interested users and
maximize the social welfare. To the best of our knowledge,
the update of ratings of both users (we name it as a two-
sided rating) matched in the service exchange game is rarely
tackled in the literature. Using game theory to analyze how
cooperation can be enforced and how to maximize the social
welfare under the designed two-sided rating protocol, we
rigorously analyze how users’ behaviors are influenced by
intrinsic parameters and design parameters as well as users’
evaluation of their individual long-term utilities, in order to
characterize the optimal design that maximizes users’ utilities
and enforces cooperation among them. The main contributions
of this paper are summarized as follows:
(i) We model the service exchange problem as an asym-
metric game model with two stages, and show that
inefficient outcome arises when no user cooperates with
each other, and thus zero social welfare is obtained at
myopic equilibrium, which is a social dilemma.
(ii) We develop the first game-theoretic design of two-sided
rating protocols to stimulate cooperation among self-
interested users, which consists of a recommended strat-
egy and a rating update rule. The recommended strategy
recommends a desirable behavior chosen from three
predefined recommended plans according to intrinsic pa-
rameters, while the rating update rule involves the update
of ratings of both users, and uses differential punishments
that punish users with different ratings differently.
(iii) We formulate the problem of designing an optimal two-
sided rating protocol that maximizes the social welfare
among all sustainable rating protocols, provide design
guidelines for determining whether there exists a sus-
tainable two-sided rating protocol under a given recom-
mended strategy, and design an algorithm achieving low-
complexity computation via a two-stage procedure, each
stage consists of two steps (we call this a two-stage two-
step procedure), in an alternate manner.
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Figure 1. A general crowdsourcing based service exchange model
(iv) We use simulation results to demonstrate how intrinsic
parameters (i.e., costs, imperfect monitoring, user’s pa-
tience) impact on optimal recommended strategies, the
design parameters to characterize the optimal design
of various protocols, and the performance gain of the
proposed optimal two-sided rating protocol.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In
section II, we describe the service exchange dilemma game
with two-sided rating protocols. In section III, we formulate
the problem of designing an optimal two-sided rating protocol.
Then we provide the optimal design of two-sided rating
protocols in Section IV. Section V presents evaluation results
to illustrate key features of the designed protocol. Finally,
conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODELS
A. Service Exchange Dilemma Game
As illustrated in Figure 1, a crowdsourcing based service
exchange system consisting of a platform with several users
on the Internet, where each user in a crowdsourcing platform
can offer services to other users. Examples of services include
sensing tasks, expert knowledge, information resource, com-
puting power, storage space, etc. The crowdsourcing process
can be described as follow: On the one hand, each user can
choose to become either a service requester (i.e., client) or
a service provider (i.e., server). On the other hand, a client
generates a service request which is sent to a matched server,
and the server devotes a high/low level of efforts to provide
the requested service to the client.
We model such a process using uniform random matching,
that is each user in the community is involved in two matches
in every period, one as a client and the other as a server, each
user is equally likely to receive exactly one request in every
period, and the matching is independent in different periods.
Note that the user with whom a user interacts as a client can
be different from that with whom he interacts as a server,
reflecting asymmetric interests between a pair of users in a
given instant. Such a model well approximates the matching
process between users in large-scale crowdsourcing systems
where users interact with others in an ad-hoc fashion and the
interactions between users are constructed randomly over time.
In this model, a user decides whether or not to request
service (choosing to be a client/server), if the user chooses
to be a server, he strategically determines his service quality
(devoting a high/low level of efforts). Note that the decisions
are sequential: the decision on role selection is made first, and
then the decision on service quality is made next. We model
this interaction as a sequential game. Formally, we have a
two-stage game. In the first stage, a user’s action is chosen
from the set {C, S}, where C stands for “choosing to be a
client” (request service), whereas S stands for “choosing to
be a server”(offer service). In the second stage, the server has
a binary choice of whether being whole-hearted or being half-
hearted in providing the service, while the client has no choice.
The set of actions for the server is denoted by {H,L} , where
H stands for “high level of effort” and L stands for “low level
of effort”.
We assume that any C strategy is costly (consumes a cost c
for choosing C). If the server devotes a high level of efforts to
fulfill the client’s request, the client receives a service benefit
of b > 0, while the server suffers a service cost of s > 0. If the
server devotes a low level of efforts to the request, both users
receive zero payoffs. Obviously, the server’s action determines
the payoffs of both users. After a server takes an action, the
client sends a report about the action of the server to the third-
party device or infrastructure that manages the rating scores
of users. Taking into account imperfect monitoring, the report
is inaccurate, either by the client’s incapability of accurate
assessment or by some system error with a small probability
ε. That is, L is reported when the server takes action H
with probability ε, and vice versa1. Assuming a binary set
of reports, it is without loss of generality to restrict ε ∈ [0, 12 ),
because when ε = 12 , reports are completely random and do
not contain any meaningful information about the actions of
users. Conveniently, Table I lists frequently used notions in
this paper.
We find the subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-stage
game. Each pair of users’ decisions made in the first stage (C
or S) result in a different second-stage game (H or L). We
1In this paper, we focus on the situation in which probability that errors
occur in the first-stage of the game is approximated by 0, because when the
probability for erroneous report of C or S is very small, errors occurring in
the first stage is easy to be detected and corrected in time.
4Table I
SUMMARY OF NOTATIONS IN THIS PAPER
Notations Physical Meanings
c cost for choosing to be a client.
s cost for devoting a high level of effort to fulfill the client’s request.
b service benefit if the service request be fulfilled.
ε probability that errors occur in the second-stage game.
ω discount factor to denote users’ patience.
P rating protocol.
θ rating label.
Θ set of rating labels.
σ social strategy.
pi recommended strategy for a server.
τ rating update rule.
αθ strength of reward imposed to a server with rating θ.
βθ strength of punishment imposed to a server with rating θ.
γθ strength of reward imposed to a client with rating θ.
δθ strength of punishment imposed to a client with rating θ.
ρ ratio of the number of a user choosing to be a client and a server.
r reported service quality by a client.
q actual service quality devoted by a server.
ηθ stationary distribution of rating labels.
v expected one-period utility of a user.
v∞ expected long-term utility of a user.
UP social utility under the rating protocol P
Table II
THE EXPECTED PAYOFF MATRIX FOR THE FIRST STAGE GAME
C S
C −c, −c εb− c, 0
S 0, εb− c 0, 0
first compute expected utilities in the second-stage game, and
then turn back to compute expected utilities when both users
choose their actions in the first-stage before knowing their
productivities. The pay-off matrix for the game played in the
first stage was depicted in Table II. The detailed computation
process is in Appendix A.
In summary, for any choice of parameters, only SS can
be a Nash equilibrium of the service exchange game. When
every user chooses his action to maximize his current payoff
myopically, an inefficient outcome arises where every user
receives zero payoff, which is a social dilemma. Under the
current framework, nobody will take the initiative to help
others, and do not expect to get help from others.
B. Two-sided Rating Protocols
We consider a two-sided rating protocol that consists of
a recommended strategy and a rating update rule. The rec-
ommended strategy prescribes the contingent plan according
to intrinsic parameters that the server should take based on
ratings of both his own and his client’s. Here, we focus on
one plan, while two other plans will be introduced in the later
half of this article. The rating update rule involves the update
of ratings of both users depending on their past actions as
a server or a client, and uses differential punishments that
punish users with different ratings differently. To the best of
our knowledge, two-sided rating protocol in crowdsourcing is
rarely tackled in the literature. In the following, we give a
formal definition of a two-sided rating protocol.
Definition 1. A two-sided rating protocol P is represented as
a 5-tuple (Θ, σ, ρ, pi, τ), i.e., a set of binary rating labels Θ,
a social strategy σ, a client/server ratio ρ, a recommended
strategy pi, and a rating update rule τ .
• Θ = {0, 1} denotes the set of binary rating labels, where
0 is the bad rating, and 1 is the good rating.
• σ : Θ → A represents the adopted social strategy for
a user with rating θ, where σ(θ|θ ∈ Θ) ∈ {{C, S} ×
{H,L}}.
• ρ : Θ → R+ denotes the ratio that a user with rating θ
chooses to become a client and a server, which contains
his historical choice and current choice of σ(θ|θ ∈ Θ) ∈
{C, S}.
• pi : Θ×Θ→ A defines the strategy σ(θS , θC) ∈ A which
the server with rating θS should select when faced with
the client with rating θC .
pi(θS , θC) =
{
1, if θS ≤ θC
0, otherwise
(1)
• τ can be denoted by a tuple (τS , τC), where τS : Θ×A →
∆(Θ) updates the rating of a server based on his current
rating, his matched client’s rating, the reported strategy
and the recommended strategy as follows:
τS(θ
′
S |θS , θC , r, pi) =

αθS , θ
′
S = 1, r ≥
pi(θS , θC)
1− αθS , θ′S = 0, r ≥
pi(θS , θC)
βθS , θ
′
S = 0, r <
pi(θS , θC)
1− βθS , θ′S = 1, r <
pi(θS , θC)
(2)
τC : Θ × A → ∆(Θ) specifies how a client’s rating
should be updated based only on his current rating as
follows:
τC(θ
′
C |θC , ρ) =

γθC , θ
′
C = 1,
ρ(θC) ≤ 1
1− γθC , θ′C = 0,
ρ(θC) ≤ 1
δθC , θ
′
C = 0,
ρ(θC) > 1
1− δθC , θ′C = 1,
ρ(θC) > 1
(3)
We characterize the erroneous report by a mapping
R : {0, 1} → ∆({0, 1}), where 0 and 1 represent
“L” and “H”, respectively. ∆({0, 1}) is the probability
distribution over {0, 1}, and R(r|q) is the probability that
the client reports received service quality “r” given the
server’s provided service quality “q”.
R(r|q) =
{
1− ε, r = q
ε, r 6= q ∀r, q ∈ {0, 1}. (4)
Remark: A schematic representation of a rating update rule
τ is provided in Figure 2. Given a rating protocol P , each
user i is tagged with a binary rating label θi ∈ Θ , {0, 1}
representing its social status. Obviously, the higher θi is, the
better the social status the user i has. Ratings of users are
5Figure 2. Schematic representation of a rating update rule τ
stored and updated by the system administrator based on
strategies adopted by the user in the transactions that he is
engaged in. The rating scheme τ can update a user’s rating
at the end of each transaction or at the beginning of the next
transaction. Under the rating update rule (2) and (3), a θS-
server (i.e., a server with rating θS) will have rating 1 with
probability αθS , and have rating 0 with probability 1 − αθS ,
if the service quality r reported by the client is no lower than
the recommended service quality pi(θS , θC); otherwise, it will
have rating 1 with probability βθS , and have rating 0 with
probability 1 − βθS . Similarly, a θC-client will have rating
1 with probability γθC and have rating 0 with probability
1−γθC if the ratio ρ ≤ 1; otherwise, it will have rating 1 with
probability δθC , and have rating 0 with probability 1 − δθC .
Obviously, αθS and γθC can be referred to as the strength of
reward imposed on servers and clients when they cooperate
with each other, respectively, while βθS can be referred to as
the strength of punishment imposed on servers when they do
not offer high level efforts, similarly, δθC can be referred to
as the strength of punishment imposed on clients when they
expect to get excessive service from others rather than to serve
others.
Definition 1 describes a simple two-sided rating protocol
which assigns binary rating labels to users, and provides a
binary choice of whether devoting a high level of effort or a
low level of effort in providing the service. Although other
more elaborate two-sided rating protocols (as discussed in
Section VI) may be considered, we show that this simple one is
effective to overcome the inefficiency of the service exchange
dilemma in crowdsourcing.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Stationary Rating Distribution
Given a two-sided rating protocol P , suppose that each user
always follows a given recommended strategy pi and keep ρ ≤
1 in any period. As time passes, ratings of users are updated,
and thus the distribution of users’ ratings in a system evolves
over time. Let ηtP(θ) be the fraction of θ-users in the total
population at the beginning of time period t, then the transition
from ηtP(θ) to η
t+1
P (θ) is determined by the rating update rule
τ , taking into account the rate λ for a user choosing to be a
client and the error probability ε, as shown in the following
expressions:
ηt+1P (0) =λ[(1− γ1)ηtP(1) + (1− γ0)ηtP(0))] + (1− λ){
(1− ε)[(1− α1)ηtP(1) + (1− α0)ηtP(0)]+
ε[β1η
t
P(1) + β0η
t
P(0)]
}
ηt+1P (1) =λ[γ1η
t
P(1) + γ0η
t
P(0)] + (1− λ){
(1− ε)[α1ηtP(1) + α0ηtP(0)]+
ε[(1− β1)ηtP(1) + (1− β0)ηtP(0)]
}
(5)
Here we set φ1 = λ(1−γ1)+(1−λ)[(1−ε)(1−α1)+εβ1],
φ0 = λ(1−γ0)+(1−λ)[(1−ε)(1−α0)+εβ0], the stationary
distribution {ηP(θ)}1θ=0 can be derived as follows.
ηP(0) =
φ1
1 + φ1 − φ0
ηP(1) =
1− φ0
1 + φ1 − φ0
(6)
Since the coefficients in the equations that define a station-
ary distribution are independent of the recommended strategy
that users should follow, the stationary distribution is also
independent of the recommended strategy, as can be seen
from Eq.(6). Thus, we will write the stationary distribution
as {ηP(θ)} to emphasize its dependence on P .
B. Sustainable Conditions
The purpose of designing a social norm is to enforce a
user to follow the recommended strategy pi(θS , θC) and keep
ρ ≤ 1 in any period. We call a user who complies with
such a social norm as a “compliant user”, otherwise, the
user who deviates from the social norm is called as a “non-
compliant user”. The compliant user will be rewarded, on the
contrary, a non-compliant user will be punished in order to
regulate his behavior. Since we consider a non-cooperative
scenario, it is important to check whether a user can improve
his long-term payoff by a unilateral deviation. Note that
any unilateral deviation from an individual user would not
affect the evolution of rating scores and thus the stationary
distribution, because we consider a continuum of users.
Let cpi(θ˜, θ) be the cost paid by a θ˜-server who is matched
with a θ-client and follows a recommended strategy pi, that is,
cpi(θ˜, θ) = s if pi(θ˜, θ) = 1, and cpi(θ˜, θ) = 0 if pi(θ˜, θ) = 0.
Similarly, let bpi(θ˜, θ) be the benefit received by a θ-client who
is matched with a θ˜-server following a recommended strategy
pi, that is, bpi(θ˜, θ) = b− c if pi(θ˜, θ) = 1 and bpi(θ˜, θ) = −c if
pi(θ˜, θ) = 0. Since we consider uniform random matching, the
expected one period payoff of a θ-user under a rating protocol
P and a chosen rate λ before he is matched is given by
vP,λ(θ) = λ
∑
θ˜∈Θ
η(θ˜)bpi(θ˜, θ)− (1− λ)
∑
θ˜∈Θ
η(θ˜)cpi(θ, θ˜)
(7)
To evaluate the long-term payoff of a compliant user, we use
the discounted sum criterion in which the long-term payoff of
a user is given by the expected value of the sum of discounted
period payoffs starting from the current period. Let pP(θ′|θ)
be the transition probability that a θ-user becomes a θ′-user in
the next period under a rating protocol P when he follows the
6recommended strategy and selects the chosen rate λ, which
can be expressed as
pP,λ(θ′|θ) =

λγθ + (1− λ)[(1− ε)αθ+
ε(1− βθ)], ifθ′ = 1
λ(1− γθ) + (1− λ)
[(1− ε)(1− αθ) + εβθ], ifθ′ = 0
(8)
The expected long-term utility of a θ-user is the infinite
horizon discounted sum of his expected one-period utility with
his expected future payoff multiplied by a common discount
factor ω, which can be computed by solving the following
recursive equation:
v∞P,λ(θ) = vP,λ(θ) + ω
∑
θ′∈Θ
pP,λ(θ′|θ)v∞P,λ(θ′) (9)
Where ω ∈ [0, 1) is the rate at which a user discounts his
future payoff, and reflects his patience2.
Together with Eq.(8) and Eq.(9), we have Eq.(10), the
detailed computation process is in Appendix B.
vP,λ(0) = λ
{
[ηP(0)(1− ε) + ηP(1)ε]b− c
}− (1− λ)s
vP,λ(1) = λ[(1− ε)b− c]− (1− λ)ηP(1)s
v∞P (1)− v∞P (0) =
ληP(1)(1− 2ε)b+ (1− λ)ηP(0)s
1 + ω(φ1 − φ0)
(10)
It is surprising that v∞P (1) − v∞P (0) is a constant given
ηP(θ), which is very convenient for optimal designing the
proposed two-sided rating protocols in the remainder of this
paper. Since users always aim to strategically maximize their
own benefits, they will find in their own self-interest to comply
with the social norm under a given two-sided rating protocol,
if and only if they cannot benefit in terms of their long-
term utilities upon deviations. We call such a protocol as
a sustainable two-sided rating protocol, and give its formal
definition as follows:
Definition 2. (Sustainable Two-sided Rating Protocols) A
two-sided rating protocol P is sustainable if and only if
v∞P,pi,λ= 12
(θ) ≥ v∞P,pi′,λ′(θ), for all pi′ 6= pi, λ′ 6= λ and θ ∈ Θ.
In other words, a sustainable two-sided rating protocol P
should maximize a user’s expected long-term utility at any
period, such that no user can gain from a unilateral deviation
regardless of the rating of his matched partner when every
other user follows the recommended strategy pi and selects
λ = 12 . It is obvious that the social welfare will be maximized
when compliant users keep ρ ≤ 1 (i.e., λ ≤ 12 ). Checking
whether a rating protocol is sustainable in the second stage
using the preceding definition requires computing deviation
gains from all possible recommended strategies. By employing
the criterion of unimprovability in Markov decision theory
[31], a user’s strategic decision problem can be formulated as
a Markov decision process under a two-sided rating protocol
P , where the state is the user’s rating θ, and the action is his
chosen strategy σ(θ), we thus establish the one-shot deviation
2It is obvious that a larger discount factor reflects a more patient user, but
no user is patient with a discount factor ω = 1 as no one is willing to stay
in a system forever.
principle for sustainable two-sided rating protocols, which
provides simple conditions.
Lemma 1. (One-Shot Deviation Principles) A two-sided
rating protocol P satisfies the one-shot deviation principle if
and only if
1
2 [ηP(1)(1− 2ε)b+ ηP(0)s]
1 + ω(φ1 − φ0) ≥
max
{ s
ω(1− 2ε)(α0 + β0 − 1) ,
ηP(1)s
ω(1− 2ε)(α1 + β1 − 1)
}
(11)
Proof: For the “if” part: A user’s expected long-term
utility when he adopts the recommend strategy pi for all θ ∈ Θ,
can be expressed as v∞P (θ) in Eq.(9) (here, we fix λ =
1
2 ).
If the user unilaterally deviates from pi to pi′ at rating θ, his
expected long term utility becomes
v∞P,pi′(θ) = vP,pi′(θ) + ω
∑
θ′∈Θ
pP,pi′(θ′|θ, α)v∞P,pi′(θ′) (12)
Where pP,pi′(θ′|θ) is the transition probability that a non-
compliant θ-server becomes a θ′-server in the next period
under P , which is expressed as
pP,pi′(θ′|θ) =

1
2γθ+
1
2 [εαθ + (1− ε)(1− βθ)], ifθ′ = 1
1
2 (1− γθ)+
1
2 [ε(1− αθ) + (1− ε)βθ], ifθ′ = 0
(13)
By comparing these two payoffs v∞P,pi(θ) and v
∞
P,pi′(θ), and
solving the following inequality:
v∞P,pi(θ)− v∞P,pi′(θ) =
1
2
∑
θ˜∈Θ
ηP(θ˜)(cpi′(θ, θ˜)− cpi(θ, θ˜))+
ω
∑
θ′∈Θ
[pP,pi(θ′|θ)− pP,pi′(θ′|θ)]v∞P (θ′) ≥ 0.
(14)
If θ=0, then for each θ˜ ∈ Θ, pi(θ, θ˜) = 1, cpi(θ, θ˜) = s and
cpi′(θ, θ˜) = 0, we have
v∞P (1)− v∞P (0) ≥
s
ω(1− 2ε)(α0 + β0 − 1) (15)
While if θ=1 and θ˜ = 1, then pi(θ, θ˜) = 1, cpi(θ, θ˜) = s
and cpi′(θ, θ˜) = 0. Else if θ=0, then pi(θ, θ˜) = 0 for each
θ˜ ∈ Θ, self-interested users have no incentive to deviate from
pi(θ, θ˜ = 0). Hence, we have
v∞P (1)− v∞P (0) ≥
ηP(1)s
ω(1− 2ε)(α1 + β1 − 1) (16)
We have inequality in Eq.(11) by substituting v∞P (1) −
v∞P (0) =
1
2 (ηP(1)b−ηP(0)s)
1+ω(φ1−φ0) into the LHS of Eq.(15) and
Eq.(16). Hence, the two-sided rating protocol P is satisfied
with the one-shot deviation principle if Eq.(11) holds.
For the “only if” part: Suppose the rating protocol P is
satisfied with the one-shot deviation principle, then clearly
there are no profitable one-shot deviations. We can prove the
converse by showing that if P is not satisfied with the one-
shot deviation principle, there is at least one profitable one-shot
7deviation. Since cpi(θ, θ˜) and cpi′(θ, θ˜) are bounded, this is true
by the unimprovability property in Markov decision theory.
Lemma 1 shows that if a user cannot gain by unilat-
erally deviating from pi only in the current period and
following pi afterwards, he can neither gain by switching
to any other recommended strategy pi′, and vice versa.
1
2
∑
θ˜∈Θ ηP(θ˜)(cpi′(θ, θ˜)− cpi(θ, θ˜)) of Eq.(14) can be inter-
preted as the current gain from choosing pi′ in the second stage,
while ω
∑
θ′∈Θ [pP,pi(θ
′|θ)− pP,pi′(θ′|θ)]v∞P (θ′) of Eq.(14)
represents the discounted expected future loss due to the
different transition probabilities incurred by choosing pi′.
After analyzing sustainable conditions in the second-stage,
we then step back to analyze sustainable conditions in the first
stage when both users choose their strategies in the first-stage
before knowing their productivities. In the first stage, users
decide the optimal chosen rate λ, and follow the recommended
strategy pi in their self-interest. Under the service exchange
dilemma game, a θ-user will find it optimal to choose to be a
client in the first stage, as his revenue is maximized when his
matched θ˜-server chooses to follow the recommended strategy
pi in the second stage, which yields payoff bpi(θ˜, θ) for him.
On the contrary, choosing to be a sever will suffer a cost
cpi(θ, θ˜). However, social welfare is maximized if and only if
every user chooses to be a server or a client with the same
probability λ = 12 , which we name it as the principle of
fairness inspired by [32], and derive incentive constraints that
characterize sustainable conditions in the first stage as shown
in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. (The Principle of Fairness) A two-sided rating
protocol P satisfies the principle of fairness if and only if
1
2 [ηP(1)(1− 2ε)b+ ηP(0)s]
1 + ω(φ1 − φ0) ≥
max
{ (1− ε)b− c+ ηP(1)s
ω[(1− ε)α1 + ε(1− β1) + γ1 − 2(1− δ1)] ,
[ηP(0)(1− ε) + ηP(1)ε]b− c+ s
ω[(1− ε)α0 + ε(1− β0) + γ0 − 2(1− δ0)]
}
(17)
Proof: For the “if” part: Assume that each user selects
λ = 12 in the first stage, and adopts the recommend strategy
pi in the second stage, then his expected long-term utility can
be expressed as
v∞P,λ= 12 (θ) =vP,λ= 12 (θ)
+ ω
∑
θ′∈Θ
pP,λ= 12 (θ
′|θ, α)v∞P,λ= 12 (θ
′) (18)
Where pP,λ= 12 (θ
′|θ) is the transition probability that a com-
pliant θ-user becomes a θ′-user in the next period when he
selects λ = 12 in the first stage under the rating protocol P ,
which can be found in Eq.(8).
As a θ-user can receive the benefit bpi(θ, θ˜) if and only
if he chooses to be a client in the current period under the
recommended strategy pi, otherwise, he will suffer a cost
cpi(θS , θC). We now suppose that a user deviates from λ = 12
to λ′ 6= 12 in the current period, and follows λ = 12 afterwards.
It is obvious that λ′ > 12 , because rewards for λ =
1
2 and
λ′ < 12 are the same, while a higher cost will be suffered
by selecting to be a server with a higher probability 1 − λ′.
Assuming that 12 < λ
′
1 < λ
′
2 ≤ 1, and according to Eq.(9), we
have
v∞P,λ′2(θ)− v
∞
P,λ′1(θ) = (vP,λ′2(θ)− vP,λ′2(θ))
+ω
{
v∞P,λ= 12 (1)[pP,λ
′
2
(1|θ)− pP,λ′1(1|θ)]
+v∞P,λ= 12 (0)[pP,λ
′
2
(0|θ)− pP,λ′1(0|θ)]
} (19)
According to Eq.(8), we have
pP,λ′2(1|θ)− pP,λ′1(1|θ)
= (λ′2 − λ′1)[γθ − (1− ε)αθ − ε(1− βθ)]
(20)
pP,λ′2(0|θ)− pP,λ′1(0|θ)
= (λ′2 − λ′1)[(1− γθ)− (1− ε)(1− αθ)− εβθ]
= (λ′2 − λ′1)[γθ − (1− ε)αθ − ε(1− βθ)]
(21)
Hence, Eq.(19) can be rewritten as
v∞P,λ′2(θ)− v
∞
P,λ′1(θ) = (vP,λ′2(θ)− vP,λ′2(θ))
+ω(λ′2 − λ′1)[γθ − (1− ε)αθ − ε(1− βθ)]
(v∞P,λ= 12 (1)− v
∞
P,λ= 12 (0))
(22)
We can derive that v∞P,λ′2(θ)−v
∞
P,λ′1(θ) is a constant accord-
ing to Eq.(10), that is v∞P,λ′(θ),∀λ′ ∈ [ 12 , 1] is a monotonic
function, which is determined by the intrinsic parameters (i.e.,
b, c, s, ε and ω), as well as the design parameters (i.e.,
(α∗θ, β
∗
θ , γ
∗
θ , δ
∗
θ ),∀θ ∈ Θ). Assuming that v∞P,λ′(θ),∀λ′ ∈
[ 12 , 1] is monotonic decreasing with λ
′, then no user will
deviate from λ = 12 as it is his optimal choice. Therefore,
we only need to check the case that v∞P,λ′(θ),∀λ′ ∈ [ 12 , 1] is
monotonic increasing with λ′. It is obvious that the expected
long-term utility of a user has its maximum value at λ′=1.
Without loss of generality, we now suppose that a user deviates
from λ = 12 to λ
′=1 in the current period, and follows
λ = 12 afterwards, then his expected long-term utilities can
be expressed as
v∞P,λ=1(θ) =vP,λ=1(θ) + ω
∑
θ′∈Θ
pP,λ=1(θ′|θ)v∞P,λ= 12 (θ
′)
(23)
Where pP,λ=1(θ′|θ) can be computed based on Eq.(3).
pP,λ=1(θ′|θ) =
{
1− δθ, ifθ′ = 1
δθ, ifθ
′ = 0 (24)
By comparing Eq.(18) with Eq.(23), we can check whether a
θ-user has an incentive to deviate from λ = 12 as follows
v∞P,λ= 12 (θ)− v
∞
P,λ=1(θ) = vP,λ= 12 (θ)− vP,λ=1(θ)+
ω
2
[(1− ε)αθ + ε(1− βθ) + γθ − 2(1− δθ)]
(v∞P,λ= 12 (1)− v
∞
P,λ= 12 (0)) ≥ 0
(25)
With simple manipulation based on Eq.(7), we can obtain that
vP,λ=1(1) = (1 − ε)b − c and vP,λ=1(0) = [ηP(0)(1 − ε) +
ηP(1)ε]b− c, together with Eq.(10), we have
vP,λ=1(1)− vP,λ= 12 (1) =
1
2
[(1− ε)b− c+ ηP(1)s] (26)
8vP,λ=1(0)− vP,λ= 12 (0) =
1
2
{
[ηP(0)(1− ε) + ηP(1)ε]b− c+ s
} (27)
If θ=1, Eq.(25) can be rewritten as
v∞P,λ= 12 (1)− v
∞
P,λ= 12 (0) ≥
(1− ε)b− c+ ηP(1)s
ω[(1− ε)α1 + ε(1− β1) + γ1 − 2(1− δ1)]
(28)
While if θ=0, Eq.(25) can be rewritten as
v∞P,λ= 12 (1)− v
∞
P,λ= 12 (0) ≥
[ηP(0)(1− ε) + ηP(1)ε]b− c+ s
ω[(1− ε)α0 + ε(1− β0) + γ0 − 2(1− δ0)]
(29)
Combining Eq.(28) and Eq.(29), sufficient conditions that a
two-sided rating protocol P is satisfied with the principle of
fairness can be obtained, as shown in inequality (17).
For the “only if” part: Suppose P is satisfied with the
principle of fairness, then clearly there are no profitable
deviations (i.e., ρ > 1 or λ > 12 ) in the first stage. We
can prove the converse by showing that if P is not satisfied
with the principle of fairness, there is at least one profitable
deviation. Since the RHS of Eq.(17) is bounded, this is true
by the unimprovability property in Markov decision theory.
Using one-shot deviation principle and the principle of
fairness, we can derive incentive constraints that characterize
necessary and sufficient conditions for a two-sided rating
protocol to be sustainable, which is formalized in the next
theorem.
Theorem 1. A two-sided rating protocol P is sustainable if
and only if it is satisfied with both of the one-shot deviation
principle and the principle of fairness.
Proof: This proof can be directly obtained from Lemma
1 and 2, and is omitted here.
C. Optimization Problem with Constraints
Under a sustainable rating protocol P , it is in the self-
interest of each user to devote a high level of effort (i.e.,
the one-shot deviation principle) and take the incentive to
serve others (i.e., the principle of fairness). Obviously, a
sustainable two-sided rating protocol always achieves a higher
social welfare than a non-sustainable one, and hence it is
only necessary to consider sustainable protocols in order to
maximize the social welfare. We assume that the protocol
designer is profit-seeking and aims to design a rating protocol
P that maximizes the expected one-period utility a user obtains
in one transaction, which is defined as the social welfare UP
in this paper. As a result, the design of the two-sided rating
protocol that maximizes the social welfare can be formulated
as follows:
Definition 3. The two-sided rating protocol design problem
can be formulated as follows:
max
(τ,pi)
UP ,
∑
θ∈Θ
ηP (θ)vP (θ) =
1
2
{
η2P(0)
[
(1− 2ε)b− s]−
ηP(0)
[
(1− 2ε)b− s]+ (1− ε)b− c− s}
s.t.
1
2 [ηP(1)(1− 2ε)b+ ηP(0)s]
1 + ω(φ1 − φ0) ≥
max
{ s
ω(1− 2ε)(α0 + β0 − 1) ,
ηP(1)s
ω(1− 2ε)(α1 + β1 − 1) ,
(1− ε)b− c+ ηP(1)s
ω[(1− ε)α1 + ε(1− β1) + γ1 − 2(1− δ1)] ,
[ηP(0)(1− ε) + ηP(1)ε]b− c+ s
ω[(1− ε)α0 + ε(1− β0) + γ0 − 2(1− δ0)]
}
(30)
It should be noted that both α0 + β0 6= 1 and α1 + β1 6= 1,
otherwise Eq.(2) will be rewritten as
τS(θ
′
S |θS , θC , r, pi) =
{
αθS , θ
′
S = 1
1− αθS , θ′S = 0 (31)
which is independent of users’ behaviors, and thus cannot
provide effective incentives.
IV. OPTIMAL DESIGN OF TWO-SIDED RATING
PROTOCOLS
In this section we investigate the design of an optimal
two-sided rating protocol that solves the two-sided rating
protocol design problem under a given recommended strategy
pi, i.e., selecting the optimal rating update rule τ , which are
determined by design parameters (αθ, βθ, γθ, δθ),∀θ ∈ Θ. In
order to characterize an optimal design which is denoted as
(α∗θ, β
∗
θ , γ
∗
θ , δ
∗
θ ),∀θ ∈ Θ, we investigate the impacts of design
parameters on the social welfare UP ,
∑
θ∈Θ ηP (θ)vP (θ),
and the incentive for satisfying constraints in Eq.(30).
A. Existence of a Sustainable Two-sided Rating Protocol
We first investigate whether there exists a sustainable two-
sided rating protocol under pi, i.e., determining whether there
exists a feasible solution for the design problem of Eq.(30).
Theorem 2. A sustainable two-sided rating protocol P under
the recommended strategy pi exists if and only if
ω ≥ max
{ 2s
(1− 2ε)[(1− 52ε+ ε2)b+ ε2s]
,
(2− 2ε)b− 2c+ (2− ε)s
[(1− 52ε+ ε2)b+ ε2s](2− ε)
,
(3ε− 2ε2)b− 2c+ 2s
[(1− 52ε+ ε2)b+ ε2s](2− ε)
}
(32)
Proof: For the “if” part: Among the eight design param-
eters, α1, α0, γ1 and γ0 can be referred to as reward factors
imposed on compliant users, while β1, β0, δ1 and δ0 can be
referred to as punishment factors imposed on non-compliant
users. The incentive for self-interested users to be a compliant
9user is maximized when we maximize all of reward factors and
punishment factors, i.e., αθ = βθ = γθ = δθ = 1,∀θ ∈ Θ.
Then, Eq.(30) can be transformed into
1
2
[(1− ε
2
)(1− 2ε)b+ ε
2
s] ≥ max
{ s
ω(1− 2ε) ,
(1− ε2 )s
ω(1− 2ε) ,
(1− ε)b− c+ (1− ε2 )s
ω(2− ε) ,
( 32ε− ε2)b− c+ s
ω(2− ε)
}
(33)
It is obvious that sω(1−2ε) >
(1− ε2 )s
ω(1−2ε) , hence, Eq.(33) can be
revised as follows
1
2
[(1− 5
2
ε+ ε2)b+
ε
2
s] ≥ max
{ s
ω(1− 2ε) ,
(1− ε)b− c+ (1− ε2 )s
ω(2− ε) ,
( 32ε− ε2)b− c+ s
ω(2− ε)
} (34)
By solving Eq.(34), we can obtain Eq.(32), that is a suf-
ficient condition that there exists a feasible solution for the
design problem. It shows that Eq.(30) always has a feasible
solution if users have sufficient patience (i.e., when the dis-
count factor ω is large). Therefore, there exists a sustainable
two-sided rating protocol if Eq.(32) holds, and ω < 1 as no
one can be 100% patient.
For the “only if” part: Suppose Eq.(32) hold, it is easy to
determine whether constraints in the design problem of (30)
are satisfied, similar as the above, the “only if” part can be
proved.
B. Optimal Values of the Rating Update Rule
In this section, we assume that Eq.(32) holds, that is,
there exists a feasible solution for the two-sided rating
protocol design problem of Eq.(30). Our goal is to select
(α∗θ, β
∗
θ , γ
∗
θ , δ
∗
θ ),∀θ ∈ Θ to maximize the social welfare
UP , that is, maximizing reward factors αθ, γθ,∀θ ∈ Θ, and
minimizing punishment factors βθ and δθ,∀θ ∈ Θ. With this
idea, Theorem 3 gives the optimal value of reward/punishment
factors except βθ,∀θ ∈ Θ.
Theorem 3. Given a sustainable two-sided rating protocol P ,
α∗θ = γ
∗
θ = δ
∗
θ = 1,∀θ ∈ Θ is always the optimal solution to
Eq.(30).
Proof: Social welfare UP is monotone decreasing with
ηP(0) ∈ [0, 1] according to Eq.(30), where ηP is monotone
decreasing with αθ ∈ [0, 1] and βθ ∈ [0, 1] for all θ ∈ Θ
according to Eq.(6), and thus UP is monotone increasing
with reward factors αθ, γθ,∀θ ∈ Θ, and the upper bound
of them is 1, with which the incentive constraints in Eq.(30)
are satisfied. As UP monotonically decreases with punishment
factors βθ,∀θ ∈ Θ, and given α∗θ = γ∗θ = 1,∀θ ∈ Θ, the
design problem is transformed into the selection of the smallest
βθ,∀θ ∈ Θ, with which the incentive constraints in Eq.(30)
are satisfied. It is obvious that the smallest βθ,∀θ ∈ Θ can
be obtained when we select the largest δθ,∀θ ∈ Θ, and the
upper bound of δθ,∀θ ∈ Θ is 1. Since UP is only determined
by βθ,∀θ ∈ Θ, rather than δθ,∀θ ∈ Θ, in order to provide
sufficient incentive and get as less βθ,∀θ ∈ Θ as possible, we
have δθ = 1,∀θ ∈ Θ. Hence, this statement follows.
By substituting αθ = γθ = δθ = 1,∀θ ∈ Θ into Eq.(6), we
have 
ηP(0) =
εβ1
2 + εβ1 − εβ0
ηP(1) =
2− εβ0
2 + εβ1 − εβ0
(35)
It is obvious that 0 < ηP(0) < 12 < ηP(1) as β1, β0 ∈ [0, 1].
Since the social welfare UP is monotone decreasing with
ηP(0), it can be shown that the problem of maximizing
UP is equivalent to the problem of minimizing ηP(0). By
substituting αθ = γθ = δθ = 1,∀θ ∈ Θ into the constraints in
Eq.(30), and replacing the objective function UP with ηP(0),
the design problem w.r.t β0 and β1 can be rewritten as
min
(β0,β1)
1
1 + 2−εβ0εβ1
s.t.
(2− εβ0)(1− 2ε)b+ sεβ1
(2 + εβ1 − εβ0)[2 + ωε(β1 − β0)] ≥
max
{ s
ω(1− 2ε)β0 ,
s(2− εβ0)
ω(1− 2ε)(2 + εβ1 − εβ0)β1 ,
[(1− ε)b− c](2 + εβ1 − εβ0) + s(2− εβ0)
ω(2 + εβ1 − εβ0)(2− εβ1) ,
[(1− ε)εβ1 + ε(2− εβ0)]b+ (s− c)(2 + εβ1 − εβ0)
ω(2 + εβ1 − εβ0)(2− εβ0)
}
(36)
It is obvious that Eq.(36) is a non-convex optimization
problem as the second constraint is a non-convex inequality
(It should be noted that Eq.(36) consists of four constraint
inequalities, which is written compactly just to save space.).
We now design an algorithm to this problem inspired by [33],
[34], it achieves low-complexity computation via a two-stage
two-step alternate manner. The proposed algorithm is outlined
in Algorithm 1, where objt denotes value of 1
1+
2−εβ0
εβ1
at the
t-th iteration. It should be noted that the value of objt of
Algorithm 1 is guaranteed to be monotonically decreasing
when optimizing one variable with another fixed in each
iteration [35]. Meanwhile, 1
1+
2−εβ0
εβ1
is lower-bounded by ε2
with the presence of imperfect monitoring (i.e., ε > 0).
Therefore, Algorithm 1 is guaranteed to converge. The detailed
explanation of Algorithm 1 can be found in the proof of
Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. Given α∗θ = γ∗θ = δ∗θ = 1,∀θ ∈ Θ, and a
residual , the output of β∗θ ,∀θ ∈ Θ by Algorithm 1 is an
optimal solution to Eq.(36).
Proof: Algorithm 1 consists of two stages, and each stage
consists of two steps. In stage (i), we first fix β0 = 1, and
then update both β1 and β0. Where stage (ii) is symmetric
with stage (i), the only difference is that we first fix β1 = 1
and then update both β0 and β1.
Step (i): Optimizing with fixed β0. Given β0, the opti-
mization problem in Eq.(36) w.r.t β1 can be rewritten as minβ1s.t.{ xiβ21 + yiβ1 + zi ≤ 0, i ∈ {1, 3, 4}
xjβ
2
1 + yjβ1 + zj ≥ 0, j ∈ {2}
(37)
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Algorithm 1 Alternate Optimal Design of Punishment factors
β0 and β1
Input: b, c, s, ε, ω and .
Output: β∗0 and β∗1 .
1: Initialize β00 = 1 and t = 1.
2: repeat
3: Update βt1 by solving Eq.(40) with given β
t−1
0 .
4: Update βt0 by solving Eq.(43) with given β
t
1.
5: t = t+ 1.
6: until (objt−1 − objt)/objt ≤ 
7: obj∗ = objt
8: Set β01 = 1 and t = 1.
9: repeat
10: Update βt0 by solving Eq.(43) with given β
t−1
1 .
11: Update βt1 by solving Eq.(40) with given β
t
0.
12: t = t+ 1.
13: until (objt−1 − objt)/objt ≤ 
14: (β∗0 , β
∗
1) = arg
(β0,β1)
min{obj∗, objt}.
Where x1 = sε2ω, y1 = sω(2 + 2ω − ωβ0), z1 = (2 −
εβ0)[s(2− ωεβ0)− ωb(1− 2ε)2β0], x2 = sεω(1− 2ε), y2 =
ω(2 − εβ0)[b(1 − 2ε)2 − sε], z2 = −s(2 − ωεβ0)(2 − εβ0),
x3 = ε
2ω(b − bε − c + s), y3 = εω(2 − εβ0)(s − c + 2b −
3bε) + ε(b− bε− c)(2− ωεβ0)− 2sεω, z3 = (2− εβ0)[(2−
εωβ0)(s+b−bε−c)−2bω(1−2ε)], x4 = ε2ω(b−bε+s−c),
y4 = εω(2 − εβ0)(bε − c) + ε(2 − εωβ0)(s − c + b − bε),
z4 = (2−εβ0)[(2−ωεβ0)(s− c+ bε)− bω(1−2ε)(2−εβ0)].
By solving inequalities in Eq.(37), we have
β1 ∈
[
− yi
2xi
−
√
(
yi
2xi
)2 − zi,− yi
2xi
+
√
(
yi
2xi
)2 − zi
]
,
∀i ∈ {1, 3, 4}
β1 ∈
[
0,
y2
2x2
−
√
(
y2
2x2
)2 − z2
]
∪[ y2
2x2
+
√
(
y2
2x2
)2 − z2, 1
]
(38)
Let ψ1u =
y2
2x2
−
√
( y22x2 )
2 − z2, ψ2u = min
i∈{1,3,4}
{
− yi2xi +√
( yi2xi )
2 − zi
}
, ψ1l = max
i∈{1,3,4}
{
− yi2xi −
√
( yi2xi )
2 − zi
}
,
ψ2l =
y2
2x2
+
√
( y22x2 )
2 − z2, Ψ1 = [ψ1l , ψ1u], and Ψ2 = [ψ2l , ψ2u],
then Eq.(38) can be rewritten as
β1 ∈ Ψ1 ∪Ψ2 (39)
The optimal value of β1 for Eq.(37) can be conducted as
follows 
minβ1
s.t. β1 ∈ [0, 1] ∩
⋂
i∈{1,2}
Ψi (40)
Step (ii): Optimizing with fixed β1. Given β1, the opti-
mization problem in Eq.(36) w.r.t β0 can be rewritten as{
minβ0
s.t. x′jβ
2
1 + y
′
jβ1 + z
′
j ≤ 0, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} (41)
Where x′1 = εω[sε + b(1 − 2ε)2], y′1 = −2bω(1 − 2ε)2 −
sεω(2 + εβ1) − sε(2 + εωβ1), z′1 = s(2 + εβ1)(2 + εωβ1),
x′2 = sε
2ω, y′2 = −sε(2 + εωβ1) − 2sεω − bεω(1 − 2ε)2β1,
z′2 = 2s(2 +ωεβ1)− sεω(1− 2ε)β21 − 2bω(1− 2ε)2β1, x′3 =
ε2ω(b − bε − c + s), y′3 = bεω(1 − 2ε)(2 − εβ1) − ε(b −
bε − c)(2 + 2w + 2wεβ1) − sε(2 + εωβ1), z′3 = −w(2 −
εβ1)[2b(1−2ε)+sεβ1]+(2+ωεβ1)[(b−bε−c)(2+εβ1)+2s],
x′4 = ε
2ω(3bε+s−c−b), y′4 = −εω[bε(β1−εβ1 +10)+2s−
2c−cεβ1−4b]−ε(2+εωβ1)(bε+s−c), z′4 = (2+εωβ1)[bε(1−
ε)β1 + 2bε+ (s− c)(2 + εβ1)]− 2ω[2b(1− 2ε) + sεβ1].
Similarly, Eq.(41) can be solved as follows
β0 ∈
[
− y
′
j
2x′j
−
√
(
y′j
2x′j
)2 − z′j ,−
y′j
2x′j
+
√
(
y′j
2x′j
)2 − z′j
]
,
∀j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
(42)
Let ϕu = min
j∈{1,2,3,4}
{
− y
′
j
2x′j
+
√
(
y′j
2x′j
)2 − z′j
}
, and ϕl =
max
j∈{1,2,3,4}
{
− y
′
j
2x′j
−
√
(
y′j
2x′j
)2 − z′j
}
, then Eq.(42) can be
rewritten as {
minβ0
s.t. β0 ∈ [0, 1] ∩ [ϕl, ϕu]
(43)
Given β0 = 1, we first calculate the smallest β1 by solving
Eq.(40), with which the incentive constraints Eq.(37) are
satisfied, then update βt0 based on β
t
1, and next repeat lines 3,
4, and 5 until the termination condition in line 6 of Algorithm
1 is satisfied. Finally, we obtain a solution and denote it as
(βi0, β
i
1) based on step (i). Similarly, we can derive another
solution (βii0 , β
ii
1 ) based on step (ii). And it is obvious that
βi0 ≥ βii0 and βi0 ≤ βii0 .
We now assume that there exists another solution (β40 , β
4
1 )
such that obj4 < min{obji, objii}. Since Algorithm 1 will
not stop to search a less value of obj if β40 6∈ (βii0 , βi0)
or β41 6∈ (βi1, βii1 ), and hence we have β40 ∈ (βii0 , βi0) and
β41 ∈ (βi1, βii1 ). Without loss of generality, we assume that
obji < objii, which means that (βi0, β
i
1) is a better choice
than (βii0 , β
ii
1 ), and β
i
1 is an optimal solution. According to
Algorithm 1, it updates βt0 by solving Eq.(43) with given
β40 > β
i
1, and it will get a smaller value of obj
4 by decreasing
β41 to β
i
1, and thus (β
4
0 , β
4
1 ) is no better than (β
i
0, β
i
1). In the
case obji > obji, it can be proved that (β40 , β
4
1 ) is no better
than (βii0 , β
ii
1 ) in a similar way, which is omitted here.
As a result, the output of Algorithm 1 is an optimal solution
to Eq.(36) with a given residual .
C. Optimal Values of the Rating Update Rules with a Stricter
Recommended Strategy
Eq.(32) shows that there exists a feasible solution for
the design problem of Eq.(30) under the condition when
the user is sufficiently patient with his discount fac-
tor ω. However, such a condition may not hold with a
small ω or max{ 2s
(1−2ε)[(1− 52 ε+ε2)b+ ε2 s]
, (2−2ε)b−2c+(2−ε)s
[(1− 52 ε+ε2)b+ ε2 s](2−ε)
,
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3. Optimal recommended strategy versus intrinsic parameters: (a) c; (b) s; (c) ε.
(3ε−2ε2)b−2c+2s
[(1− 52 ε+ε2)b+ ε2 s](2−ε)
} ≥ 1. In this condition, we should select
a stricter recommended strategy pis among the total of 24
possible recommended strategies, which is denoted as follows
pis(θS , θC) =
{
1, if θC ≥ 1
0, otherwise
(44)
Eq.(10) will be rewritten as
vP,λ,pis(0) = λ(εb− c)− (1− λ)ηP(1)s
vP,λ,pis(1) = λ[(1− ε)b− c]− (1− λ)ηP(1)s
v∞P,λ,pis(1)− v∞P,λ,pis(0) =
λ(1− 2ε)b
1 + ω(φ1 − φ0)
(45)
The two-sided rating protocol design problem with a strict
recommended strategy pis, that is, Eq.(30) can be rewritten as
follows:
max
(τ,pis)
UP ,
∑
θ∈Θ
ηP (θ)vP (θ) =
1
2
(1− ε)b− c− s− ηP(0)[(1− 2ε)b+ s])
s.t.
(1− 2ε)b
2 + 2ω(φ1 − φ0) ≥
max
{ ηP(1)s
ω(1− 2ε)(α0 + β0 − 1) ,
ηP(1)s
ω(1− 2ε)(α1 + β1 − 1) ,
(1− ε)b− c+ ηP(1)s
ω[(1− ε)α1 + ε(1− β1) + γ1 − 2(1− δ1)] ,
εb− c+ ηP(1)s
ω[(1− ε)α0 + ε(1− β0) + γ0 − 2(1− δ0)]
}
(46)
By solving Eq.(46) with fixed αθ = βθ = γθ = δθ =
1,∀θ ∈ Θ, we can obtain necessary and sufficient conditions
for the existence of a feasible solution for the design problem
of Eq.(46) as follows
ω ≥ max
{ (2− ε)s
b(1− 2ε)2 ,
2[(1− ε)b− c] + (2− ε)s
b(2− ε)(1− 2ε)
}
(47)
Note that there exists a sustainable two-sided rating protocol
under a stricter recommended strategy pis if and only if
max
{
(2−ε)s
b(1−2ε)2 ,
2[(1−ε)b−c]+(2−ε)s
b(2−ε)(1−2ε)
}
< 1.
Given αθ = γθ = δθ = 1,∀θ ∈ Θ, the design problem in
Eq.(46) w.r.t β0 and β1 can be rewritten as
min
(β0,β1)
1
1 + 2−εβ0εβ1
s.t.
(1− 2ε)b
2 + ωε(β1 − β0) ≥
max
{ s(2− εβ1)
ωβ0(1− 2ε)(2 + εβ1 − εβ0) ,
s(2− εβ1)
ωβ1(1− 2ε)(2 + εβ1 − εβ0) ,
[(1− ε)b− c](2 + εβ1 − εβ0) + s(2− εβ1)
ω(2 + εβ1 − εβ0)(2− εβ1) ,
(εb− c)(2 + εβ1 − εβ0) + s(2− εβ1)
ω(2 + εβ1 − εβ0)(2− εβ0)
}
(48)
An important observation is that Algorithm 1 can be ef-
ficiently used to handle the design problem of Eq.(48) in a
similar manner, which is omitted here.
V. EVALUATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to evaluate the
key features of our proposed two-sided rating protocol de-
signed for service exchange dilemma in crowdsourcing. First
of all, we show how to determine the optimal recommended
strategy as intrinsic parameters vary. Secondly, we investigate
the impact of intrinsic parameters on design parameters.
Thirdly, we examine the performance of the optimal design
of two-sided rating protocols. Throughout our experiments,
the benefit b for unit service exchange is normalized to be
1, cost c and s are restricted to be smaller than b. Finally,
we investigate how to implement the proposed protocol in a
crowdsourcing based service exchange system in details.
A. Optimal Recommended Strategy Against Intrinsic Param-
eters
Figure 2 shows that the optimal recommended strategy is
determined by intrinsic parameters c, s, ε and ω. When both
of c and ω are sufficiently large (given b=1, s = 0.2 and
ε = 0.05) as shown in Figure 2(a), the recommended strategy
pi can be sustained, and thus be selected to be the optimal
choice among the other two candidate recommended strategies
pis and pi0. Under pi0, the server will be recommended to
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Figure 4. The impact of design parameters β0 and β1 against intrinsic parameters: (a) c; (b) s; (c) ε; (d) ω.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 5. Normalized performance against intrinsic parameters: (a) c; (b) s; (c) ε; (d) ω.
provide low-quality service regardless of his own and his
client’s ratings. As c or ω decreases, pi cannot be sustained
any more, hence, the optimal recommended strategy changes
from pi to pis. The main reason behind this phenomenon is
that, smaller c and ω introduce a higher probability for self-
interested users to deviate from the principle of fairness, which
needs a stricter recommended strategy pis to increase users’
incentive to comply with the social norm. When the region
of c and ω in which pis is not sustained, pi0 will be the
unique sustainable recommended strategy, which yields zero
social welfare for each user, since full cooperation cannot be
achieved in such a scenario.
Figure 2(b) shows the optimal recommended strategy with
b = 1, c = 0.4 and ε = 0.05 as s and ω vary. As s increases, a
user with a higher ω has higher probability to be a compliant
user. Otherwise, pi will not be sustained, and thus the stricter
recommended strategy pis will be selected to be optimal. When
there does not exist any sustainable rating protocol in the
region of s and ω, in order to obtain maximal social welfare,
the optimal recommended strategy changes from pi to pis and
eventually to pi0. A similar phenomenon can be found in Figure
2(c), which plots the change of optimal recommended strategy
versus ε and ω with given b = 1, c = 0.4 and s = 0.2.
B. The Impact of Intrinsic Parameters on Design Parameters
Figure 3 plots how the optimal design (β0 and β1) is
influenced by intrinsic parameters c, s, ε, and ω. There does
not exist a sustainable two-sided rating protocol with the
recommended strategy pi when c is sufficiently small, as shown
in Figure 3(a). This is because users will choose to be a client
with a higher probability λ > 12 , that is they will deviate from
the principle of fairness when c is small (e.g., c < 0.305000).
As c increases, we can obtain a higher β0 and a lower β1, this
is due to the fact that a higher c introduces a higher ηP(0),
and hence it needs a higher β0 to punish non-compliant users.
When c is sufficiently large, β0 and β1 will not change, since
a large c do not affect on the sustainable of rating protocols,
and thus it is no necessary to enhance the punishment factors.
Figure 3(b) is very similar with Figure 3(c), these two
figures plot the impact of s and ε on the design parameters
β0 and β1, respectively. As s and ε increase, it becomes more
difficult to incentivize users to comply with the social norm,
and punishment factors β0 and β1 should be increased to
sustain a rating protocol. Different from Figure 3(b) and 3(c),
punishment factors β0 and β1 decrease as ω increases, this
is because it is easier to give incentives to comply with the
social norm and punishments through the designed two-sided
rating protocol. It can be observed that β0 is always larger
than β1 in all of the four subfigures in Figure 3, this is due to
the fact that ηP(0) < ηP(1), in order to sustain the designed
two-sided rating protocol with sufficient punishment, a larger
β0 and a lower β1 will receive a better performance.
C. Performance Efficiency
Figure 4 examines the performance of the optimal design
two-sided rating protocol against intrinsic parameters c, s,
ε and ω (denoted as UP ). For the comparison, the social
optimum (1−ε)b−c−s (denoted as UC) is considered, which
can be exactly achieved only by users with ρ = 1 (or λ = 12 ),
who provide high-quality service all the time when they are
matched as servers, however, it is not an equilibrium. In other
words, such a social optimum is impossible to be achieved.
Our goal is to be as close as possible to this social optimum.
The social welfare UP monotonically decreases with c, s
and ε, but increases with ω, where UC is only determined
by c, s and ε, and is independent of ω with given b = 1.
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In Figure 4(a), the performance gap between UP and UC is
almost unchanged. The major reason is that the impact of c on
punishment factors can almost be ignored, thus both UP and
UC change only against the value of c with given b, s, ε and
ω. While as shown in Figure 4(b) and 4(c), the performance
gap between UP and UC becomes more significant as s and ε
increase, respectively. This is because the incentive to comply
with the social norm decreases and so is his one-period utility,
and hence punishment factors β0 and β1 will be increased to
provide sufficient incentive, thus reduces the social welfare
UP . In particular, the gap between UP and UC is gradually
narrowed as ω increases, as shown in Figure 4(d). Since
users have more patience when the discount factor ω of users
increases from 0 to 1, it becomes easier to sustain a two-sided
rating protocol, thereby leading to a decrease in punishment
factors and an increase in social welfare.
D. Implementation Issues
As shown in Figure 1, we assume that the protocol designer
stands at the crowdsourcing platform’s point of view, and ex-
plores the strategy of users aiming to maximize their utilities.
The implementation of the proposed protocol consists of five
stages:
(i) The protocol designer measures intrinsic parameters (i.e.,
b, s, c, ε and ω) of the system.
(ii) According to part A of Section V, the protocol designer
investigates whether there exists a sustainable two-sided
rating protocol, as well as how to choose the optimal
recommended strategy, both of which are determined by
intrinsic parameters.
(iii) The optimal design parameters (i.e., αθ, βθ, γθ, δθ, ∀θ ∈
Θ) can be calculated from the results in part B of Section
V.
(iv) Based on the calculated result in stage (iii), the perfor-
mance of the proposed protocol can be examined.
(v) By comparing the gap between the theoretical and practi-
cal values of social welfare, the protocol designer updates
the design parameters in order to increase the practical
value of social welfare.
We divide the above five stages into two parts: (1) Direct
implementation of stages (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) is a one-round
implementation, which is based on evaluation results obtained
in the first half of Section V. (2) Bargaining implementation
of stage (v) in a trial-and-error way. This is because users may
not be entirely rational in a real crowdsourcing scenario, and
hence the protocol designer should decrease reward factors
(αθ, γθ, ∀θ ∈ Θ) and increase punishment factors (βθ, δθ,
∀θ ∈ Θ) to compel users to contribute well behaviors in the
initial stage, and then try to update reward factors as well
as punishment factors gradually in order to be closer to the
theoretical value. However, technical details on how to update
the design parameters are beyond the scope of this work and
are left for future study.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a service exchange dilemma in
a two stage game, and developed a game-theoretic design of
two-sided rating protocol to stimulate cooperation among self-
interested users, and thus overcome the inefficiency of the
socially undesirable equilibrium. By rigorously analyzing how
users’ behaviors are influenced by intrinsic parameters, design
parameters, as well as users’ valuation of their individual long-
term utilities, we characterize the optimal design by selecting
eight optimal design parameters (αθ, βθ, γθ, δθ), ∀θ ∈ Θ,
where we proved that α∗θ = γ
∗
θ = δ
∗
θ = 1,∀θ ∈ Θ is always the
optimal solution of Eq.(30), and designed a two-stage two-step
algorithm to select δ∗θ ,∀θ ∈ Θ which achieves low-complexity
computation in an alternate manner. The social welfare UP
obtained by our proposed two-sided rating protocol P can be
very close to the social optimum, especially when users are
sufficiently patient and the monitoring and reporting error is
small.
Although we have proved that the service exchange dilemma
can be efficiently solved by the proposed two-sided rating pro-
tocol, one might be curious about the effect of implementing
more elaborate two-sided rating protocols. In the following,
we point out a few extendable directions for future work.
First, rating labels can be extended from two levels to
multiple levels. As shown in our previous work [13], to study
multi-level problem, one should consider how to determine
an optimal size K of rating labels, as well as a threshold
value κ that a user with θ ≥ κ or θ < κ will be rewarded
or punished, respectively. In this case, two additional design
parameters are added to the two-sided rating protocol design
problem, which greatly increases the computation complex
of the problem. How to find out an algorithm with a lower
computation complexity is a challenging problem.
Second, it is interesting to design multiple levels of actions
for a server in the second stage game. In order to incentivize
self-interested users to contribute good behaviors, an elaborate
rating update rule τ consisting of more reward factors and
punishment factors should be carefully designed.
Third, taking into account continuous rating labels is a chal-
lenging task, because reward factors and punishment factors
should be designed as convex functions and concave func-
tions, respectively, which greatly increases the computational
complexity of optimal design.
Fourth, considering continuous actions for a server is
another challenging task, as the design parameters will be
replaced by elaborate continuous function.
Fifth, the above four cases can be combined pair by pair,
which is an interesting problem. On the other hand, the
difficulty of the problem is greatly enhanced, and is deferred
to a future study.
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Table III
PAYOFF MATRIX OF EACH USER FOR THE SECOND-STAGE UNDER THE
(C,S) CASE
user2
H L
user1 (1− ε)b− c, −s εb− c, 0
APPENDIX
A. Computation Process for Table II
The computation process for Table II in four cases is shown
as follows:
Case I: (C, S), i.e., user 1 requests services as a client, and
user 2 chooses to be a server.
When a user requests services as a client, a matching rule
is used to determine corresponding server. We model the
interaction between a pair of matched users in the second
stage as a gift-giving game [30], and the payoff matrix of the
gift-giving game between a client and a server is presented in
Table III. We assume that b > c+s1−ε so that the service of a
user creates a positive net social benefit, and social welfare is
maximized when all servers choose action H in the gift-giving
games they play, which yields payoff (1−ε)b− c−s to every
user. On the contrary, action L is the dominant strategy for the
server, which constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the gift-giving
game.
We now take a step back and compute expected utilities for
such a case. When the client consumes a cost c for choosing
C in the first stage, and receives εb− c payoff in the second
stage, the server will choose L and suffer a low cost, which
is approximated by 0 here. Such a case also results in zero
payoff. We summarize this in the CS cell of the pay-off matrix
in Table II.
Case II: (S,C), i.e., user 1 chooses to be a server and user
2 chooses to be a client. Case II is symmetric with case I .
Thus, the ex-ante utility of user 1 is v1 = 0, and the ex-ante
utility of user 2 is v2 = εb− c.
Case III: (C,C), i,e., both users choose to request services
as clients. Each user consumes a cost c, but receives zero
service benefit as there is no user offering service. We describe
this in the CC cell of the pay-off matrix in Table II.
Case IV : (S, S), i.e., The expected utility of each user is
zero as no user requests service. The SS cell of the pay-off
matrix in Table II describes such a case.
B. Computation Process for Eq.(10)
Given a rating protocol P and a chosen rate λ, we can
derive the expected payoff of a θ-user according to Eq.(7) as
follows:
vP,λ(0) =λ[η(0)bpi(0, 0) + η(1)bpi(1, 0)]
−(1− λ)[η(0)cpi(0, 0) + η(1)cpi(0, 1)]
vP,λ(1) =λ[η(0)bpi(0, 1) + η(1)bpi(1, 1)]
−(1− λ)[η(0)cpi(1, 0) + η(1)cpi(1, 1)]
(49)
On the one hand, a user chooses C and S with probabilities
λ and 1 − λ, respectively. And whether a user is matched
with a 0-user or a 1-user is determined by ηP(0) and ηP(1),
respectively. On the other hand, a user can receive service
benefits by choosing C and consume a cost to provide service
by choosing S. As bpi(0, 0) = b− c, bpi(1, 0) = 0, cpi(0, 0) =
s, and cpi(0, 1) = s, and taking the monitoring error ε into
consideration, vP,λ(0) in Eq.(49) can be rewritten as
vP,λ(0) = λ
{
[ηP(0)(1− ε) + ηP(1)ε]b− c
}− (1− λ)s
(50)
Similarly, as bpi(0, 1) = b−c, bpi(1, 1) = b−c, cpi(1, 0) = 0,
cpi(1, 1) = s, and given ε, vP,λ(1) in Eq.(49) can be rewritten
as
vP,λ(1) =λ[(1− ε)b− c]− (1− λ)ηP(1)s (51)
Given a rating protocol P and a chosen rate λ, the expected
long-term utilities of a 0-user and a 1-user according to Eq.(9)
can be derived as follows:
v∞P,λ(0) =vP,λ(0) + ω[pP,λ(0|0)v∞P,λ(0)
+pP,λ(1|0)v∞P,λ(1)]
v∞P,λ(1) =vP,λ(0) + ω[pP,λ(0|1)v∞P,λ(0)
+pP,λ(1|1)v∞P,λ(1)]
(52)
By substituting Eq.(50) and Eq.(51) into the RHS of
Eq.(52), we have
v∞P (1)− v∞P (0) =
ληP(1)(1− 2ε)b+ (1− λ)ηP(0)s
1 + ω(φ1 − φ0) (53)
REFERENCES
[1] W. J. Howe, “The rise of crowdsourcing”, Wired magazine 14 (6), pp.
1-4, 2006.
[2] J. Howe, “Crowdsourcing: A Definition”, 2006. [Online]. Available:
http://crowdsourcing.typepad.com/cs/2006/06/crowdsourcing a.html
[3] Amazon Mechanical Turk. [Online]. Available: http://www. mturk.com/
[4] Yahoo! Answers. [Online]. Available: https://answers.yahoo.com/
[5] Upwork. [Online]. Available: https://www.upwork.com/
[6] H. Hu, G. Li, Z. Bao, Y. Cui, and J. Feng, “Crowdsourcing-based real-
time urban traffic speed estimation: From trends to speeds”, in Proc. of
32nd International Conference on Data Engineering (ICDE), Helsinki,
Finland, 16-20 May, 2016, pp. 883-894.
[7] Y. Wu , Y. Wang, W. Hu, and G. Cao, “SmartPhoto: A Resource-Aware
Crowdsourcing Approach for Image Sensing with Smartphones”, IEEE
Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 15 , issue. 5, pp.1249-1263,
May 2016.
[8] A. Tarable, A. Nordio, E. Leonardi, and M. A. Marsan, “The importance
of being earnest in crowdsourcing systems”, in Proc. of 34th IEEE
Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM), Hong Kong,
China, 26 April-1 May, 2015, pp. 2821-2829.
[9] A. Kittur, et al., “The future of crowd work”, in Proc. of 16th ACM
Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work and Social
Computing (CSCW) , San Antonio, Texas, USA, 23-27 Feb., 2013, pp.
1301-1318.
[10] V. Naroditskiy, N. R. Jennings, H. P. Van, and M. Cebrian, “Crowd-
sourcing contest dilemma”, Journal of the Royal Society Interface, vol.
11, no. 99, pp. 1-8, Aug. 2014.
[11] K. Oishi, M. Cebrian, A. Abeliuk, and N. Masuda, “Iterated crowd-
sourcing dilemma game”, Scientific Reports, 4:4100, pp. 1-7, 2014.
[12] Y. Xiao, and M. van der Schaar, “Socially-optimal Design of Service
Exchange Platforms with Imperfect Monitoring”, ACM Transactions on
Economics and Computation, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 25:1-25:25, Jul. 2015.
[13] J. Lu, C. Tang, X. Li, and Q. Wu, “Designing Socially-Optimal Rating
Protocols for Crowdsourcing Contest Dilemma”, IEEE Transactions on
Information Forensics and Security, vol.12, issue 6, pp.1330-1344, Jun.
2017.
[14] N. Archak, and A. Sundararajany,“Optimal Design of Crowdsourcing
Contests”, in Proc. of 30th International Conference on Information
Systems (ICIS), Phoenix, Arizona, USA, Dec. 2009.
15
[15] A. I. Chittilappilly, L. Chen, and S. Amer-Yahia, “A Survey of General-
Purpose Crowdsourcing Techniques”, IEEE Transactions on Knowledge
and Data engineering, vol. 28, no. 9, pp. 2246-2266, Sep. 2016.
[16] Y. Zhang, J. Park, and M. van der Schaar, “Rating Protocol in Online
Communities”, ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, vol.
2, no. 1, Article 4, pp. 4:1-4:34, Mar. 2014.
[17] D. Dipalantino, and M. Vojnocic, “Crowdsourcing and all-pay auctions”,
in Proc. 10th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACE), Stan-
ford, CA, USA, 6-10 Jul. 2009, pp. 119-128.
[18] X. Zhang, et al., “Keep your promise: Mechanism design against free-
riding and false-reporting in crowdsourcing”, IEEE Internet Things
Journal, vol. 2, no. 6, pp. 562-572, Dec. 2015.
[19] M. Feldman, C. Papadimitriou, J. Chuang, and I. Stoica, “Free-riding
and Whitewashing in Peer-to-Peer Systems”, IEEE Journal on Selected
Areas in Communications, vol. 24, no. 5, pp. 1010-1019, May 2006.
[20] Y. Zhang, C. Jiang, L. Song, M. Pan, and et al, “Incentive Mechanism
for Mobile Crowdsourcing Using an Optimized Tournament Model”,
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 35, no.4, pp.
880-892, Mar. 2017.
[21] T. Luo, S. S. Kanhere, S. K. Das, and H. Tan, “Incentive Mechanism
Design for Heterogeneous Crowdsourcing Using All-Pay Contests”,
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 15, no. 9, pp. 2234-2246,
Sep. 2016.
[22] A. Singh, and L. Liu, “TrustMe: Anonymous management of trust
relationships in decentralized P2P systems”, in Proc. of 3rd International
Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P), Linkoping, Sweden, Sep.
2003, pp. 142-149.
[23] M. Kandori, “Social norms and community enforcement”, The Review
of Economic Studies, vol. 59, no. 1, pp. 63-80, 1992.
[24] H. Xie, and J. C. S. Lui, “Incentive Mechanism and Rating
System Design for Crowdsourcing Systems: Analysis, Tradeoffs
and Inference”, IEEE Transactions on Services Computing, DOI:
10.1109/TSC.2016.2539954, March 2016.
[25] Y. Zhang, and M. van der Schaar, “Collective Rating for Online Com-
munities with Strategic Users”, IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing,
vol. 62, no.12, pp. 3069-3083, April 2014.
[26] L. A. Adamic, J. Zhang, E. Bakshy, and M. Ackerman, “Knowledge
sharing and Yahoo Answers: Everyone knows something”, in Proc. 17th
International Conference on World Wide Web (WWW), Beijing, China,
21-25 Apr. 2008, pp. 665-674.
[27] S. L. Hew, and L. B. White, “Cooperative resource allocation games in
shared networks: symmetric and asymmetric fair bargaining models”,
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 7, no. 11, pp.
4166-4175, Nov. 2008.
[28] A. Gupta, C. Langbort, and T. Ba?ar, “Dynamic Games With Asymmet-
ric Information and Resource Constrained Players With Applications to
Security of Cyberphysical Systems”, IEEE Transactions on Control of
Network Systems, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 71-81, Mar. 2017.
[29] M. Feldman, C. Papadimitriou, J. Chuang, and I. Stoica, “Free-riding
and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems”, IEEE Journal on Selected
Areas in Communications, vol. 24, no. 5, pp. 1010-1019, May 2006.
[30] P. Johnson, D. Levine, and W. Pesendorfer, “Evolution and information
in a gift-giving game”, J. Econ. Theory vol. 100, no. 1, pp. 1-21, 2000.
[31] P. Whittle, “Optimization over Time”, Wiley, New York, 1983.
[32] B. Partov, and D. J. Leith, “Utility Fair Rate Allocation in LTE/802.11
Networks”, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, vol. 25, no. 2, pp.
1076-1088, Apr. 2017.
[33] X. Liu, et al., “Multiple Kernel k-Means with Incomplete Kernels”, in
Proc. of 31th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), San
Francisco, California, USA, 4-9 Feb. 2017, pp. 2259-2265.
[34] X. Liu, et al., “Optimal Neighborhood Kernel Clustering with Multiple
Kernels”, in Proc. of 31th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(AAAI), San Francisco, California, USA, 4-9 Feb. 2017, pp. 2266-2272.
[35] J. C. Bezdek, and R. J. Hathaway, “Convergence of alternating opti-
mization”. Neural, Parallel, and Scientific Computations, vol. 11, no.4,
pp. 351-368, Dec. 2003.
